We examine the effect of corporate governance on the use of dividends and repurchases, composition of payout, and inclusion of a pre-commitment feature in the payout policy. We find that dividend payout is decreasing in governance quality. Corporate governance has a mixed effect on repurchases: good external governance prompts managers to repurchase more and to use repurchases as the only form of payout, but good internal governance lowers the need for repurchases. High agency costs due to weak corporate governance increase the likelihood of having cash distributions and decrease the reliance on discretionary payouts. The use of dividend pre-commitment in the payout policy serves as a substitute for strong corporate governance. 
Introduction
Extensive empirical evidence shows that many firms pay dividends despite their cost, but a growing fraction of firms is observed substituting stock repurchases for dividends. This paper examines the effect of corporate governance on the use of dividends and repurchases, composition of payout, and inclusion of a pre-commitment feature in the payout policy. We propose an agency-driven explanation for the choice between dividends and repurchases and provide empirical support for the hypothesized relation between corporate governance quality and corporate payout.
We argue that dividend policy is a pre-commitment device that can be adopted to reduce agency costs and raise firm value. A promise to distribute cash on a regular basis serves to mitigate the manager-shareholder agency conflict. While dividends can increase firm value by bonding the manager, they are associated with tax costs. Dividend pre-commitment also causes the manager to bypass some positive-NPV projects or obtain costly external financing in the periods of low cash flow. Repurchases allow ex post adjustments to the payout policy, thus enabling the firm to take advantage of most of its investment opportunities. In exchange for greater flexibility, repurchases do not represent an ex ante pre-commitment and are much less effective in resolving the agency conflict. Poor corporate governance exacerbates the agency costs, shifting the trade-off in favor of higher dividends and greater reliance on dividend precommitment. Extending the dividends-driven analysis of corporate payout, we formulate and test complementary hypotheses for share repurchases and total payout.
The free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) does not distinguish between the use of different forms of payout to mitigate agency costs. By proposing a governance interpretation of the design of payout policy, choice of dividends and repurchases, and the dividends-repurchases tradeoff, we contribute to the existing agency and dividends literatures.
Our paper relates to the existing work on corporate payout. Easterbrook (1984) proposes that dividends reduce the agency costs of free cash flow and minimize suboptimal managerial behavior. The free cash flow theory can be extended to form predictions about dividends and governance. Since good governance limits the potential for suboptimal managerial behavior, the agency costs and the cash distributions required to offset them are lower. Optimal payout policy design aimed at maximizing firm value would therefore indicate a negative relation between governance quality and the level of payout. More generally, our study is related to Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2004) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2005) that find a positive relation between governance and the level of cash holdings driven by quicker dissipation of excess cash reserves in the presence of entrenchment. Although dividends are shown to respond to low investment opportunities, ownership structure, and CEO compensation, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the role of governance in determination of dividends.
The counter-argument would suggest that ex post deviations from the optimal payout policy can occur due to costly firing of CEOs and that dividends are decreasing in the degree of managerial entrenchment. Examining differences in shareholder rights protection around the world, LaPorta et al. (2000) find that dividends are lower in countries with weaker investor protection. Consistent with it, cash holdings of firms are decreasing in the level of investor protection (seem e.g., Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003) . Our results are based on the US sample and show the negative effect of governance on the level of dividends. Besides dividends, we examine repurchases, total payout, the choice between dividends and repurchases and the composition of payout.
Our work differs from the existing literature (for a survey of work on payout policy see, e.g. Allen and Michaely, 2002; Baker, Powell, and Veit, 2002) in addressing several unanswered questions about payout policy from the perspective of agency theory and governance quality.
The agency view does not explain the choice of repurchases over dividends. From the free cash flow perspective, any form of distribution of excess cash to shareholders addresses the agency issue. We propose and test an agency explanation for the dividends-repurchases tradeoff that relies on the use of pre-commitment to dividends and conduct a systematic investigation of the relation between corporate governance, different forms, incidence, levels, and composition of firm payout. We arrive at the following empirical results.
First, we study the effect of good corporate governance on the incidence and level of dividend payout. We adopt the indicator of external corporate governance that proxies for the susceptibility of the manager to the market of corporate control (external governance). In addition to the G index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , we employ an exogenous measure of takeover vulnerability that aggregates several provisions from state antitakeover laws. Controlling for investment opportunities, financial flexibility, firm size, and information effects, greater susceptibility to takeovers -both at the firm and at the state level -lowers the propensity to pay dividends and the likelihood of being a dividend payer. Good internal corporate governance is also associated with lower dividends and lower incidence of dividend payout.
Second, we analyze the impact of good governance on share repurchases. We contend that stock repurchases, being a more flexible instrument of cash distributions, are largely a discretionary tool of corporate payout rather than a form of pre-commitment. Existing empirical evidence suggests that repurchases are more irregular than dividends and primarily serve to distribute large temporary windfalls of cash. We find that managers in firms with strong external governance are more likely to repurchase and on average will repurchase more. Absence of antitakeover protections encourages managers to dispense cash to shareholders in a more effective manner. Controlling for other factors, managers are more likely to make discretionary payouts if they are vulnerable to the corporate control market. On the other hand, we find that, as in the case of dividends, good internal governance reduces the incidence of repurchases. The results on internal governance for the level of repurchases are weaker, but we find that the inclusion of other proxies for monitoring does not affect the positive sign on the external governance index.
We rely on this evidence to motivate our third set of results, on the structure and type of corporate payout. A combination of good external and internal governance mechanisms lowers the potential and incentives for suboptimal ex post managerial behavior. As a result, ex ante design of payout policy can place a greater weight on less costly discretionary type of payout and exclude pre-commitment to dividends. Firms with stronger external and internal governance are more likely to rely solely on repurchases in their payout. We find strong empirical support for the prediction that better governed firms gear their payout towards repurchases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes our hypotheses. Section III describes the sample, variables, and methodology. Section IV presents the empirical results and robustness checks. Section V concludes and discusses our results.
II. Corporate payout and governance: testable hypotheses

Governance and dividends
Below we formulate empirical hypotheses that relate governance quality to firm dividend and repurchase behavior and payout policy design. Agency theory provides a general framework for the role of dividends as a method of mitigating agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984) . Dividends reduce the amount of suboptimal investment, impose additional monitoring by forcing the manager to address the external financing market, and increase managerial risk-taking (by replacing leverage, dividends lowers the expected loss of human capital due to bankruptcy). The free cash flow theory has found empirical support (see, e.g. Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993) .
Our study of governance and payout is related to prior work that examined the effects of ownership structure on payout policy. The existing empirical evidence is mixed. Rozeff (1982) and Hu and Kumar (2004) find that firms with low insider ownership pay higher dividends. On the other hand, Fenn and Liang (2001) find that payout is increasing in managerial ownership for firms with high agency costs and Nam, Wang, and Zhang (2004) find a positive association between post-tax cut dividend increases and managerial ownership. Amihud and Li (2002) find a negative relation between institutional ownership and dividends focusing on the informational aspects of dividends. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) argue that institutional investors substitute for the monitoring and signaling role of dividends. In contrast, Short, Zhang, and Keasey (2002) find a strong positive relation. Controlling for the endogeneity of institutional ownership, Grinstein and Michaely (2001) find no significant effect on cash distributions; however, institutional investors prefer firms that pay lower dividends (but avoid non-payers) and repurchase shares regularly. Gugler (2003) finds that dividends are higher for state-owned firms than for family-owned firms using an Austrian sample. Hu and Kumar (2004) find that longer CEO tenure, smaller ownership, larger cash compensation, and fewer stock options as well as board independence and the absence of a large shareholder are associated with higher dividends, but the results for total payout are less significant.
We use the free cash flow argument as the starting point and specifically focus on the role of governance in determination of dividends controlling for other firm characteristics. Better corporate governance induces more optimal use of firm resources by managers and lowers the benefit of dividend use. On the other hand, dividends impose tax costs on the payer firm. Regular dividend payments also incur the cost of forgone positive-NPV projects or the added cost of raising external financing to fund them when internally generated cash is insufficient. Since dividends are costly and better quality of corporate governance lowers the agency costs of free cash flow, we expect the following to hold: D1. Firms with better governance pay lower dividends.
Differently from the existing work, we focus on the effect of corporate governance on payout policy of US firms and distinguish between the effects of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms after controlling for miscellaneous dividend determinants, including ownership structure and compensation.
The hypothesis above hinges on the assumption that payout policy maximizes firm value.
The manager either adheres to the ex ante set optimal policy or chooses the level of payout that mitigates agency costs. However, in the presence of weak governance, firing is more costly, so entrenched managers can make financial decisions in their own self-interest (e.g. Zwiebel, 1996) .
In the case of leverage, entrenched managers take on less debt (Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997 ). Brown and Caylor (2004) study governance and six performance measures, including dividend yield, and find a positive association between an aggregate governance index and dividend payout, but their analysis uses few controls related to dividends and employs OLS framework. In LaPorta et al. (2000) , country-level shareholder rights protection index is associated with lower dividends and lower sensitivity of dividends to investment opportunities, supporting the opposite hypothesis: D2. Good governance increases dividends.
In an environment with strong legal protection, however, we expect that the possibility for the entrenched manager to avoid dividends will be limited and the relation between dividends and firm-level governance will not be positive. Since performance-based firing is relatively more common and the stock market reacts strongly to dividend cuts and omissions, regular dividend payouts can serve as a condition of staying with the firm with a weak governance structure. The hypothesized negative relation between governance and dividends remains our main prediction.
Governance, repurchases, and total payout
We also examine the effect of governance on repurchases and total payout. On the one hand, the free cash flow theory does not distinguish between dividends and repurchases, so the substitution argument underlying our main dividends hypothesis can be extended to repurchases and total payout. Although the propensity to pay dividends has decreased (Fama and French, 2001) , with stock repurchases often replacing dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2002) , repurchase behavior is consistent with the free cash flow explanation (see, e.g., Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; Dittmar, 1999; Heron and Lie, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2004) . Applying this to our case, entrenched managers can be distributing more cash overall, either through repurchases or dividends:
R1. Firms with better governance repurchase less.
T1. Firms with better governance distribute less cash to their shareholders.
On the other hand, compared to dividends, repurchases have greater flexibility and can be viewed as largely discretionary managerial payouts. Ex post deviations from the previously announced repurchase policy are more common and less consequential for the stock price than dividend cuts, so entrenchment can be associated with a suboptimal repurchase policy.
Managerial entrenchment is more likely to affect ex post behavior with respect to irregular cash distributions (repurchases) because the need to make them is less verifiable and no perceived pre-commitment is made. Hence, when investment opportunities within the work and an excess of cash is present, an entrenched manager is less likely to use the discretion to repurchase in the shareholders' interest. Instead, excess cash can be retained in the firm or channeled into inefficient investment projects (Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2004; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2005 ).
In the agency context, corporate payout serves to avoid wasting excess cash on negative-NPV projects. Large cash excesses due to accumulation of free cash flow or large cash windfalls can be undesirable even if investment opportunities are expected to improve in the future because diminishing returns limit the portion of excess cash that can be optimally invested.
Shareholders will prefer a well governed manager to distribute cash if they can realize a higher return on investment outside the firm. In the absence of a pre-commitment, better governed managers can be expected to distribute cash more willingly than entrenched managers, controlling for other firm characteristics.
The threat of dismissal can cause managers to make strategic share purchases to reduce the monitoring pressure. Fluck (1999) shows theoretically that, without being afforded the protection of entrenchment, managers will voluntarily limit private benefits of control when they cannot effectively counter disciplinary actions of shareholders.
The presence of good governance lowers the manager's potential gain from avoiding a discretionary payout when firm investment opportunities are poor. Effective monitoring mechanisms decrease the potential for deriving private benefits of free cash flow. Further, if the manager who is not entrenched avoids the needed payout but the firm realizes a low return, market value will fall over time, which increases the threat of firing through regular CEO turnover or a takeover. Also, if the manager expects firm investment opportunities to improve, she will use available excess cash to repurchase firm shares but will not sell any of her own shares so that, when profits increase next period, the manager will hold a higher relative stake in the firm (Ofer and Thakor, 1988) . For an entrenched manager, the ensuing loss of private benefits of free cash flow and increase in risk will reduce such gains from a firm repurchase program. In other words, undervalued firm shares can be the best way to invest excess cash when present investment opportunities are poor. We have discussed the motivation for our alternative prediction concerning repurchases: R2. Repurchases are increasing in the quality of governance If the R2 hypothesis is supported, the sign of the effect of governance on total payout will depend on the relative role of dividends versus repurchases. If dividends have a high share and the D1 hypothesis holds, the relation between total payout and governance will be dominated by the negative effect of governance on dividends. Otherwise, the sign may be reversed. We discuss our hypotheses about payout composition later in this section.
External versus internal governance and payout
The discussion of managerial entrenchment and payout should take into account the properties of the monitoring mechanisms in place. To our knowledge, existing work has not distinguished between external and internal governance in the analysis of payout policy. Internal governance can provide more accurate information about managerial behavior, firm investment opportunities, and future firm prospects. It is therefore possible to tie the threat of dismissal to instances of inefficient investment with a smaller margin of error and managers face a lesser need to make strategic share purchases to counter the disciplinary pressure. Undertaking efficient investment contributes to greater job security in the absence of entrenchment, reducing the need for repurchases (hypothesis R1).
External monitoring by the corporate control market, on the other hand, is based on the observed firm performance and provides a very limited look into the optimality of managerial decisions. Firm performance can be affected by factors unrelated to suboptimal managerial behavior, but a drop in market value makes the firm more susceptible to a takeover and increases the risk of firing for the manager. Managers that are not afforded the protection from the corporate control market will use discretionary payouts more frequently to sustain firm value during periods of low investment opportunities. Payout can be used directly to thwart a pending takeover threat that would have otherwise been mitigated by the firm's antitakeover provisions.
Defensive payouts encourage existing shareholders to reject the raider's offer and can discourage the raider from proceeding by raising the current market value of the firm. Although dividends lower the risk of a takeover (Dickerson, Gibson, and Tsakalatos, 1998) , repurchases deter takeovers more effectively by targeting shareholders with the lowest valuations and shifting up the distribution of firm values among not tendering shareholders (Bagwell, 1991) . Strong external corporate governance is more likely to drive managers to repurchase (hypothesis R2).
At the same time, both good internal and external governance mechanisms lower the optimal level of dividends (hypothesis D1) since they diminish the potential for suboptimal managerial investment and the agency costs of free cash flow.
Governance, dividend pre-commitment, and payout policy design
We have separately considered dividends and repurchases as they relate to managerial incentives arising from governance. Adding to previous work, we also examine the effect of governance on the structure and design of payout policy and form hypotheses about payout composition and policy type. One of the key payout policy decisions is whether to pre-commit to dividends to address the agency conflict. The disadvantage of dividends stems from its tax status and the lack of flexibility compared to repurchases. Dividend cuts are costly and rare, so if investment opportunities improve in the future, they are more likely to be ignored or financed externally rather than through downward adjustments to dividend policy. Discretionary payouts through stock buybacks allow the manager to use more accurate information that arrives every period in making payout decisions. However, regular dividend payments is a more effective solution to severe agency manager-shareholder conflicts since entrenched managers will apply excess cash to inefficient projects in the absence of pre-commitment.
Managers in firms with high agency costs will pre-commit to regular payments to raise firm value and continue payouts to shareholders to avoid disciplinary action. Managers in firms with better governance will avoid pre-commitment because the expected loss of firm value due to the agency costs of free cash flow. When a firm with good governance faces cash excesses, the manager will either store them in them for future investment or distribute them to shareholders through discretionary payouts. We hypothesize that pre-commitment to dividends will substitute for strong (external or internal) governance, yielding the following predictions:
P1. Firms with bad governance are more likely to pre-commit to dividends and use dividends as the only form of payout; firms with good governance will be more likely to use repurchases as the only form of payout.
P2. The share of dividends in total firm payout is increasing in governance quality.
The above hypotheses also imply that total payout will tend to be negatively associated with governance even if repurchases are positively associated with governance because entrenched managers tend to rely on dividends more and pay higher dividends.
Contributing to the existing literature, our analysis disaggregates corporate payout into dividends and repurchases because of their different role in mitigating the agency costs of free cash flow. We build separate agency explanations of managerial incentives to distribute cash through these forms of payout and identify a potential difference in the effects of external and internal governance. We also account for the pre-commitment feature of dividends and address the issue of the effect of governance on the design of payout policy.
Governance and payout when agency costs are high
The last part of our analysis examines the effect of governance on payout in subsamples of firms with low and high agency costs of free cash flow. We expect that the following prediction holds:
A1. The effect of governance on payout is stronger in the presence of high free cash flow.
III. Data
Sample selection
Data on firm dividend policies and performance are obtained from Compustat Industrial Annual for 1992-2003. Data for year 1991 is used when lags are needed to construct the variables. The sample includes all (active and inactive) Compustat firms except those in the regulated utilities and financial sectors (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999). We further eliminate observations with book value of total assets less than $20 mln., firms incorporated outside the United States, and LBOs (Compustat stock code 4). We require that the data on payout, firm-level control variables, and corporate governance be available. Our main sample has 9,464 observations (6,974 obs. with available data on past and present share of repurchases in total payout). The variables are explained below.
Variables
Our dependent variables include payout ratio, composition of payout, and payout policy type dummies constructed on firm-year basis. Payout ratio is defined as the percentage of cash dividends, share repurchases, or total payout in the book value of total assets of the firm. We use the ratio based on the market value of the firm as a robustness check. The payout ratio variables are censored at 0 from below. We compute the share of repurchases in total payout to measure the composition of payout. The variable is censored at 0 from below and at 1 from above and is defined only for payer firms. The presence of dividends, repurchases, or total payout is captured by dummy variables equal to 1 if a positive cash distribution to shareholders is made and 0 otherwise. We also construct dummy variables for payout policy type: dividends as the only form of payout, a combination of dividends and repurchases, and repurchases as the only form of payout.
We use a set of explanatory variables to control for other determinants of corporate payout that can be correlated with good governance. The lag of dividends is expected to enter with a positive coefficient (Lintner, 1956) . We include the lag of the dependent variable in all payout analyses, but we expect to see the highest coefficient in the case of dividends. We include the percentage of EBITDA in total assets to account for the positive relation between cash flow and payout. Investment and growth opportunities are expected to enter with a negative sign since growing firms with more positive NPV projects face less severe potential agency problems and a higher opportunity cost of payout. Investment opportunities are measured by the growth of sales, market-to-book ratio. As a robustness check, we use investment to sales ratio. The ratio of R&D to sales captures investment opportunities as well as the information asymmetry about the firm.
We use share of intangible assets and the logarithm of the number of one-year-ahead analyst earnings forecasts (obtained from I/B/E/S database) for robustness. Size is positively correlated with dividends (Fama and French, 2001 ), so we control for the log of the book value of total assets. Firm risk also increases the cost of sustaining dividends, so we expect a negative sign on the annual standard deviation of excess return. We expect firms faced with a higher share of income taxes in EBIT to have lower dividends. In robustness checks, we control for measures of stock performance (average excess returns) and liquidity (bid-ask spreads) based on CRSP data.
Leverage (the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets) is expected to be correlated with lower dividends and is used as a robustness check. A high level of debt substitutes for the pre-commitment and takeover deterrence role of dividends, increases the cost of sustaining dividends, and may involve covenants that restrict dividend payments.
The share of repurchases in total payout and the likelihood of adopting a repurchasesonly payout policy will also be influenced by various firm characteristics, including taxes, financial flexibility demands (Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 2000) , information asymmetry, option-based executive compensation (Fenn and Liang, 2001; Hu and Kumar, 2004) , high leverage, and the quality of investment opportunities. For instance, firms with better investment and growth opportunities, R&D, high risk, tax burden, and leverage face a higher cost of dividends. Larger firms can experience more severe agency problems or have a lower cost of sustaining dividends. Managers awarded option grants are not compensated for the loss of value of their portfolio due to dividends, so they prefer repurchases (Fenn and Liang, 2001 ). Our governance variables are described below. Following Ishii, Gompers, and Metrick (2003), we use the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Governance database to construct our measure of external governance. We rescale the variable by subtracting the G index from 24 (the maximum possible value) so that higher values indicate better governance (as in Cremers and Nair, 2005) . The IRRC database covers the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002 of our sample period. We fill in the values for the gap years using the adjacent value or the average of the two adjacent values. For robustness, we use the sample that contains only the original IRRC years. A possible reservation regarding the use of the G index is the concern about endogeneity because firm antitakeover provisions could be influenced by the payout policy.
Pugh and Jahera (1997) present univariate evidence on dividend increases following the adoption of state antitakeover laws, so we construct the second external governance index using only provisions of state antitakeover laws and use it as a robustness measure.
We construct several proxies for internal corporate governance. Yermack (1996) identifies smaller boards as a factor in higher firm valuations. We obtain board size from the IRRC Directors database. The data for early years (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) ) is reset to the 1996 level, following the assumption that governance mechanisms are relatively stable over time. The largest institutional blockholding variable is based on quarterly institutional ownership data from Thomson Financial 13f filings. Quarterly data are averaged for each firm-year. Institutional holdings data is reset to 0 if missing (as in Cremers and Nair, 2005) . We construct an aggregate index of internal governance by sorting the firms into quartiles by the largest institutional blockholding, board size, and the proportion of independent directors on board (IRRC Directors), described in Appendix A.
The stake of the CEO in the firm and the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of new stock option grants to the firm market value are obtained from Execucomp, starting from 1992. We expect a negative effect of stock options on dividends and a positive effect on repurchases regressions. The sign of ownership effect is ambiguous.
Following Frank and Goyal (2003), we replace missing values for certain financial items with zeros. All financial firm characteristics are winsorized at 0.5% of the sample distribution to address the potential problem with extreme observations. We also winsorize internal governance and analyst forecast variables. The external governance index is a categorical variable and is not winsorized. Appendix A describes the construction of the variables. Descriptive statistics and univariate correlations of the main variables are presented in Table 1 , Panel A.
[insert Table 1 ]
Methodology
We begin with two-sided two-sample t-tests to assess the differences in the payout policy of firms with governance quality above and below the sample median. Multivariate analysis controls for additional firm characteristics. We employ Tobit regressions for payout ratio and payout composition to avoid biases from using OLS estimation with censored variables. The likelihood of being a payer or having a particular type of payout is predicted with the Logit model. All regressions are performed in the panel data format and include year dummies 2 .
IV. Results
The correlations in Table 1 , Panel B show that dividends, repurchases, and total payout are positively associated with cash flow and negatively associated with growth opportunities and firm risk. Dividends and total payout are also negatively associated with R&D, consistent with the free cash flow intuition. Dividends are strongly negatively associated with both external and internal governance measures. Repurchases are positively associated with external corporate governance. Total payout is strongly negatively correlated with internal corporate governance.
The effect of stock options is negative for dividends, as could be expected.
Below we provide the results of t-tests of means. We divide the observations into subsamples based on the quality of governance.
[
insert TABLE 2]
Firms with better internal and external governance have lower dividends. Approximately 72% of firms with bad governance pay dividends, with 25% fewer observations in the good external governance subsample and 15% fewer observations in the good internal governance subsample recording positive dividends. The incidence of any form of payout is lower among firms with good governance (10%-13%). These firms are also more likely to use repurchases as the only form of payout. Firms with good governance have a higher share of repurchases in total payout. Univariate evidence suggests that overall payout is decreasing in governance quality, with some exceptions in the case of repurchases. The same relation preserves for the subsample of firms with positive total payout. However, we have not controlled for other firm characteristics that can be correlated with corporate governance as well as payout. To address the issue, we use Tobit regressions using a set of firm-level controls described in the previous section.
[insert TABLE 3] We perform regressions separately for dividends and repurchases.
In dividends regressions, both external corporate governance index and internal corporate governance index have strongly significant negative coefficients. Firms with poor governance mechanisms are not able to curtail suboptimal managerial investment through corporate control market or active internal monitoring, yielding high agency costs of free cash flow. The optimal level of dividend payments is higher than it would be for a firm with good corporate governance.
In the presence of sophisticated shareholder rights laws, disclosure standards, and developed financial markets applicable to the US sample, entrenched managers comply with dividend precommitment and sustain overall higher dividends. Our results show a negative relation between dividend payout and governance (consistent with hypothesis D1), regardless of monitoring type.
The results are different in the case of repurchases. External corporate governance is positively associated with repurchases (hypothesis R2). Managers susceptible to the corporate control market undertake higher discretionary payouts, controlling for other firm characteristics.
The internal corporate governance index is insignificant, with the substitution and entrenchment effects possibly offsetting each other (hypotheses R1 and R2). We conclude that the type of governance mechanism is important for determining the level of discretionary cash distributions undertaken by the manager. A lack of takeover defenses increases the risk of firing when firm value is low, so the manager is prompted to undertake discretionary cash distributions to respond to the threat of dismissal.
Coefficients on the lag of payout ratio enter with positive and strongly significant signs, with dividends showing a higher degree of persistence than repurchases. Consistent with the free cash flow theory predictions, ROA enters with a positive sign and growth opportunities enter with a negative sign, both for dividends and repurchases. The market-to-book ratio is insignificant in most specifications, likely because our proxies for growth and investment opportunities are correlated 3 . R&D has a negative effect on dividends and a positive effect on repurchases (the latter could be due to informational considerations). Riskier firms have lower dividends and repurchases due to a higher demand for flexibility and the resulting higher cost of payout. Firm size also has the predicted positive sign, both for dividends and repurchases. Taxes have an insignificant effect on dividends (the effect is marginally significant and positive for repurchases). Incentive alignment mechanisms significantly affect payout policy. Managers receiving more stock option grants pay lower dividends and undertake a higher level of repurchases, consistent with prior work. CEO ownership is positively associated with dividend payout, i.e. CEOs with a higher stake in the firm have a stronger financial interest in paying dividends to shareholders. The effect of ownership on repurchases is insignificant.
The next table analyzes the level and composition of total payout in the Tobit framework using the same set of controls.
insert TABLE 4]
Opposite signs on external corporate governance and stock option grants variables in dividends and repurchases regressions offset each other, resulting in a lack of significance of these variables in the total payout case. However, internal corporate governance is negatively correlated with total payout. We conclude that internal monitoring lowers the level of cash the manager has to distribute to shareholders to address the free cash flow problem (hypothesis T1).
Total payout is less persistent than dividend payout or repurchases. The effect of growth opportunities is negative. Firms with higher cash flow on average distribute more cash. The positive effect of firm size and negative effect of risk preserve in the total payout case.
Columns IV-VI of Table 4 use the share of repurchases in total payout as the target variable. External governance has a positive effect on the share of repurchases (hypothesis P1).
Managers in companies with fewer antitakeover provisions distribute more cash through stock repurchases. Internal corporate governance is insignificant, consistent with the negative sign obtained both in dividends and repurchases regressions. Managers less entrenched by antitakeover provisions are able to avoid the high cost of dividend pre-commitment and conduct most cash distributions through repurchases.
One potential limitation of using the share of repurchases to characterize payout policy is the potential for overstatement of the role of repurchases in the presence of mixed policies due to the fact that repurchases tend to be larger than regular dividends. Below we use Logit analysis to examine payout policy design and the presence of different payout components and their combinations.
[insert TABLE 5] Firms with good internal governance are less likely to distribute cash through any means, which confirms the conjecture that active monitoring of the manager substitutes for payout in all forms (hypotheses D1, R1, T1). Good external corporate governance is associated with lower incidence of dividends (hypothesis D1), lower incidence of cash distributions in general (hypothesis T1), and higher incidence of share repurchases (hypothesis R2). All of the effects are statistically significant. We conclude that the likelihood of positive payout is higher in firms with weak governance, but susceptibility to the corporate control market encourages managers to repurchase more.
Consistent with expected signs on control variables, the incidence of dividends, repurchases, or total payout is increasing in cash flow and firm size and decreasing in risk and growth and investment opportunities. Stock option grants are associated with a lower probability of having dividends, but CEO ownership increases the likelihood of dividends.
Columns IV-VI of Table 5 focus on the probability of specific types of payout policy.
The manager can use either dividends or repurchases as the only form of payout, adopt a mixed policy with some combination of the two, or choose not to distribute cash at all. The probability of adopting a mixed policy is decreasing in the quality of corporate governance. Repurchases are more likely to be used as the only form of payout in the presence of good governance (hypothesis P1). Firms with good external governance are less likely to use dividends as the only form of payout. We conclude that firms with better monitoring tend to avoid pre-commitment to dividends, consistent with our prediction.
The Logit results presented so far are based on the full sample of firms. Below we restrict the sample to payer firms only (i.e. cases when total payout is positive). We consider pairs of payout policy types to determine the effect of governance on the choice between mixed and dividends-only policy, mixed and repurchases-only policy, and dividends-only and repurchasesonly policy.
[insert Payer firms with better governance (internal and external) are more likely to use repurchases as the only form of payout than to use dividends only, consistent with the precommitment prediction (Column III). Firms are more likely to adopt a mixed policy rather than use repurchases only when their governance (internal and external) is poor (Column IV).
Governance does not affect the choice between dividends as the only form of payout and a mixed policy (Column V) for payer firms. These results lend further support to our pre-commitment conjecture (hypothesis P2). Badly governed firms are more likely to pre-commit to dividends and to avoid the use of repurchases as the only form of payout. However, the decision to use repurchases in addition to dividend pre-commitment is influenced by other factors.
We conclude our main analyses with the consideration of subsamples by the severity of agency costs. The high agency cost subsample includes firms with growth opportunities below or at the sample median and cash flow above the sample median. Tobit regressions are repeated for dividends and repurchases in each subsample. The variables used to define the subsamples are omitted to avoid biased estimates.
insert TABLE 7]
For the subsample with low free cash flow, internal governance is not significantly related to dividend payout. Neither governance mechanism has a significant effect on repurchases. The relation between governance and payout is significant in the high free cash flow subsample: negative for dividends in the case of both internal and external governance, positive for repurchases in the case of external governance, and negative for repurchases in the case of internal governance. Governance is more important for the determination of payout when the free cash flow problem is more severe (hypothesis A1).
Robustness checks
The results on payout and governance continue to hold after a number of robustness checks.
One potential concern with the interpretation of external governance coefficients is the endogeneity of governance quality due to inclusion of firm charter provisions. The agency conflict can be mitigated simultaneously through an improvement in governance and precommitment to dividends. Payout policy can influence governance quality. For instance, regular dividends can weaken shareholder response if the manager attempts to increase the degree of entrenchment by influencing the governance mechanisms in the firm. Managers can agree to a reduction in the number of antitakeover provisions while continuing to repurchase actively as a form of takeover deterrence.
To address this potential issue, we use the exogenous external governance measure based only on state antitakeover law provisions (see, e.g., Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Pugh and Jahera, 1997). The correlation between the original external governance measure and the state law measure is 0.30 and strongly statistically significant. As before, the state antitakeover laws index yields strongly significant results for dividends (negative), repurchases (positive), and the share of repurchases (positive).
[insert TABLE 8]
Columns I-IV of Table 9 also introduce alternative internal governance proxies that control for the stake of the largest institutional blockholder and board size instead of the internal governance index used previously. Institutional holdings and small board size are negatively related to dividends, consistent with the previous results. Small boards are also associated with lower overall payout and lower repurchases, but a higher share of repurchases. The signs and significance are consistent with evidence presented in the main regressions.
In other robustness checks, we include additional controls for firm investment, intangible assets, stock performance, bid-ask spread, analyst following, and leverage. The variables are intended to account for informational characteristics of the firm and capital structure. The main results do not change: governance quality is negatively related to dividends and overall payout, but external governance determines the preference towards repurchases and a higher level of repurchases.
[insert TABLE 9] We further check our results for robustness using an alternative sample selection criterion and a different definition of the payout ratio. Columns I-IV of Table 10 reproduce the results for the sample of the original IRRC Governance years (without filling in the values for the gap years). Coefficients on governance measures follow a similar pattern.
insert TABLE 10]
The payout ratios used in the previous analysis were defined with respect to the book value of total assets. Columns V-VII of Table 10 use the ratio of payout to the market value of the firm to account for the potentially significant discrepancy between the book value and the market value. For instance, repurchases can be tailored to the market value of the firm, so better governed firms that realize market value gains will have overstated payout ratios according to the book value measure that can be falsely attributed to the effect of good governance. The book value and the market value measures have correlations of 0.79 for dividends, 0.81 for repurchases, and 0.75 for total payout. The pattern of the signs and significance preserves.
VI. Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of corporate governance on the use of dividends and repurchases, composition of payout, and inclusion of a pre-commitment feature in the payout policy. We find that the incidence of payout is significantly lower among firms with better governance because these firms face lower agency costs of free cash flow. In the presence of high agency costs, governance plays a greater role in determining corporate payout.
Dividends are more effective than repurchases at mitigating the agency costs of free cash flow due to their pre-commitment nature and higher cost of deviations from the dividend policy.
Contrary to LaPorta et al. (2000), we find that firm dividend policies are a substitute for weak corporate governance (at the internal and external level). In the US, where the legal environment supports high overall standards of investor protection, entrenched managers follow through with dividend pre-commitment. Firms with better governance tend to avoid the costs associated with dividends in an attempt to achieve a more efficient investment policy.
The type of governance mechanism and its ability to detect suboptimal managerial behavior is also important in understanding managerial incentives to make payouts, especially in the case of discretionary cash distributions. The evidence on firm repurchase policy and governance reflects a combination of the substitution and entrenchment predictions, with significance attributed to the type of monitoring mechanism in place. The incidence and the level of repurchases are higher for firms with better external governance. Managers susceptible to the corporate control market repurchase shares to maintain firm valuation and address the higher threat of dismissal. However, good internal corporate governance (board, institutional blockholders) mitigates the asymmetry of information about managerial actions and reduces the need for discretionary payouts. Managers in firms with strong internal monitoring are able to sustain high market valuations by conducting efficient investment without resorting to costly payout.
Finally, accounting for the pre-commitment feature of dividends helps us to better understand the structure of payout and payout policy design. Entrenched managers are more likely to include pre-commitment to dividends in their payout policy whereas well governed managers are more likely to use repurchases as the only form of payout. We find that the use of dividend pre-commitment mitigates the manager -shareholder agency conflict and substitutes for good governance.
Our work has implications for future research. At the theoretical level, both governance quality and payout policy can minimize agency costs. Brown and Caylor, 2004; Yermack, 1996) .
Robustness variables
DIV_PAYOUT(II) Ratio of cash dividends (#127 a ) to market value (#24*#25 +#9 a +#34), multiplied by 100; censored from below at 0. Source: Compustat.
REP_PAYOUT(II) Ratio of purchase of common and preferred stock (#115 a ) to market value (#24*#25+#9 a +#34), multiplied by 100; censored from below at 0. Source: Compustat.
TOT_PAYOUT(II) = DIV_PAYOUT(II) + REP_PAYOUT(II); censored from below at 0. Source: Compustat.
INVESTMENT
Ratio of capital expenditure (#128 a ) to total assets (#6). Source: Compustat.
INTANGIBILITY Ratio of intangible assets (#33 a ) to total assets (#6). Source: Compustat.
BID-ASK Annual average of the absolute value of the difference between bid and ask price. Source: CRSP monthly ANALYSTS Natural log of the number of one-year-ahead analyst forecasts of EPS for the current fiscal year. Source: I/B/E/S.
RETURN
Annual average of excess return (holding period return net of value-weighted market return). Source: CRSP monthly.
LEVERAGE
Ratio of book value of current and long-term debt (#9+#34) to total assets (#6). Source: Compustat.
EXT_GOV(II) (6 -S)/6, where S is the state laws index constructed by adding 1 for the presence of each of the following state laws: recapture of profits -antigreenmail law; business combination law; cashout law; director's duties law; fair price law; control share acquisition law. Source: IRRC Governance b . Higher values indicate better governance. 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003) were filled in using the closest value or the average of the two closest values for IRRC years (1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002) . c Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Directors data set. Early years (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) filled in using the values for 1996, the earliest available year. 
Panel B. Correlations among variables
The sample includes all Compustat Industrial Annual firms excluding: firms incorporated outside the US; firms in financial and regulated utilities industries (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4000-4999); firms with total assets (#6) less than 20 mln.; LBOs ( Table 2 . Payout policy and governance: univariate analysis.
Two-sample t-tests performed on payout policy characteristics based on the quality of governance. The firm belongs in the 'Good' governance subsample if its governance index value exceeds the sample median; 'Bad' otherwise. The measures EXT_GOV and INT_GOV are used separately. The null hypothesis is that the difference of the means is zero. The alternative hypothesis is that the difference of means is not zero (two-sided -likelihood -9,128 -9,103 -9,088 -19,284 -19,279 -19 ,278 ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; † significant at 10% 48, 183 48, 198 48, 200 8, 711 8, 632 8, ,210 ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; † significant at 10% -3,927 -8,675 -10,675 -1,835 -7,674 -16,799 -20 ,620 ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; † significant at 10%
